The parties entered into a long-term

Defendant lessors appealed judgments from the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), which, after a reduction for comparative negligence, entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff lessees on a fraud claim. The jury found in favor of the lessors on a cross-complaint for breach of contract and awarded damages in an amount smaller than the lessors had sought.

The parties entered into a long-term lease for a restaurant property and an asset purchase agreement. The lease contained an integration clause and “as is” language with respect to restaurant equipment. Disputes soon arose regarding repairs and maintenance. ADA compliance attorney near me The lessees alleged in their complaint that the lessor’s managing member had given them oral assurances the property was in good condition and the lessor would maintain it. The trial court allowed the lessees to introduce evidence of the alleged oral statements. The court held that the statements were parol evidence under Civ. Code, § 1625, because they were inconsistent with express provisions of the lease. The evidence was properly admitted, however, under the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule in Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g). The court concluded that parol evidence was admissible with regard to claims of fraud in the inducement involving sophisticated parties, in light of a recent decision from the California Supreme Court eliminating a judicially created rule that had narrowed the fraud exception. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings as to reasonable reliance.

The court affirmed the judgments on both the complaint and the cross-complaint, affirmed an attorney fee award, and reversed an award of damages with respect to a preliminary injunction.

Appellants, owners of a small business, sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which, after the owners failed to timely vacate property taken by respondent school district in an eminent domain proceeding, awarded penalties to the district pursuant to the terms of a stipulation.

The district paid part of the owners’ claim for relocation expenses. The trial court excluded evidence of unreimbursable expenses. Pursuant to a stipulation, the owners were allowed extra time to relocate their business and agreed that a daily penalty would be deducted from their compensation for every day that they remained on the property beyond a specified date. The owners vacated the property 10 days after the agreed deadline. The court stated that expenses incurred to mitigate loss of business goodwill might be compensable under Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, and Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.510, under some circumstances. Such expenses were not compensable under § 1263.510, however, if they constituted moving expenses or reestablishment expenses as defined by Gov. Code, § 7262, and Cal. Code Regs., tit. 25, § 6090. The owners did not show that their claimed expenses did not fall within these definitions. The owners inadequately briefed an argument that the penalty was unconscionable, and the argument lacked merit in any event. The owners were not entitled to a jury trial regarding the penalty because it was not part of the issue of just compensation under Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.310.

The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.